Borgs et al. [2016] investigate the essential requirements for community in preference networks, and defined six axioms on community detection rules (or community functions). Two of these axioms play critical roles in their system, however, it is coNP-complete to check whether they are satisfied. We propose efficiently-checkable alternatives to the two axioms, and prove that various desirable properties are preserved. Most strikingly, the new axioms enable to easily find constructive and consistent community functions. Actually, we find such a natural community function which is also enumerable and samplable, answering an open problem in the literature. We further discuss how to infer a corresponding preference network from a given collection of communities. We completely solve the problem when the simplest community rule is used, and uncover an inherent limitation of preference networks. Motivated by this observation, we extend the concept of preference to multi-preferences and prove that any collection of communities can be exactly generated by multi-preferences.
Introduction
Community detection is a fundamental task in data mining, which has been adequately studied on networks modeled by graphs. However, there does not exist a widely accepted definition of clustering (see e.g., [Everett and Borgatti, 1998; Kannan et al., 2001; Dongen, 2002; Newman, 2004; Shao et al., 2015] ) or overlapping clustering (community) (see e.g., [Palla et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2007; Gregory, 2007; Yang et al., 2013] ), which makes it challenging to compare two or more clustering or community detection techniques.
In order to tackle this problem in a systematic way, researchers started considering axiomatic approaches. As a pioneer, Kleinberg [2003] developed an axiomatic framework for clustering and defined clustering functions whose inputs are a node set V of size n and pairwise distances between these n nodes. The output of a clustering function is a partition of V . Based on Arrow's impossibility theorem on social choice [Arrow, 1963] , he found that there are three simple properties which cannot be satisfied by any clustering function at the same time.
Recently, Balcan et al. [2013] defined communities in networks in which every node has a preference, i.e., a total order of all nodes, by the community function proposed by Mishra et al. [2008] . Borgs et al. [2016] called such network a preference network and defined community functions that map a preference network to a set of communities. Preference networks can be used in various occasions, e.g., voting ( [Gale and Shapley, 1962; Gusfield and Irving, 1989; Roth, 1984a] ), network routing ( [Rekhter and Li, 1994; Caesar and Rexford, 2005] ), and coalition formation in collaborative games ([Brams et al., 2003; Roth, 1984b] ). Borgs et al. also came up with six axioms for community functions. They observed that community functions satisfying all the six axioms form a lattice. In addition, they gave community functions in the bottom (the minimum, called C cliq ) and in the top (the maximum, called C comp ) of the community function lattice.
In the six axioms mentioned above, the group stability axiom (GS) plays a very important role but is coNP-complete to verify on a community. We define a new axiom strong group stability (SGS) and then get rid of the coNP-completeness.
Though community detection is a classic topic, the inverse problem of network generation has much less results. Network generation is the problem of, given subsets of nodes, inferring a preference profile such that all the given subsets are communities in the generated network. With this preference profile, one can find some hidden communities that was not present in the given set. Furthermore, we observe that in order to capture some natural communities it is necessary to use multi-preference networks (referred as multi-facted preference networks in [Borgs et al., 2016] ) in which every node is allowed to have multiple preferences. We propose an algorithm to infer a multi-preference profile from given communities.
In summary, our contributions are threefold:
1. We propose two polynomial-time-checkable alternatives SSA and SGS to the two critical axioms SA and GS which are coNP-complete to check.
answering an open problem in [Borgs et al., 2016] .
3. We show that generally a multi-preference network cannot be reduced to a single-preference network, and develop an algorithm to infer a multi-preference profile from given communities.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give necessary notions and notations. We define polynomialtime alternatives to two important axioms GS and SA in Section 3. In the same section, we present a systematic way to construct consistent and constructive community functions, and give an ideal community function C grow . In Section 4, we discuss the inverse problem of constructing preference networks from given communities. For non-overlapping communities, we construct a single preference profile; for general communities, we construct a multiple preference profile. We conclude this paper in Section 5 with an open problem.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review notions and notations that are used in this paper. For more details, see [Borgs et al., 2016] .
Let V be a non-empty finite node set and L(V ) be the set of total orders on V . Every π ∈ L(V ) is a bijective mapping
is referred to the rank of u in π, and we say that π ranks u
of total orders on V . For each u, v, w ∈ V , π u is called the preference of u, and by "u prefers v over w" we mean that π u (v) < π u (w). A preference network is a pair (V, Π) where V is a non-empty finite set and Π is a preference profile on V . A community rule (or community function) is a function C that maps a preference network (V, Π) to a collection S of subsets of V . If S ∈ C(V, Π), we say that S is a community of (V, Π) according to C, and the term "according to C" will be omitted if clear from context. We consider community function C cliq as an example.
In this community rule, every community S is called a clique.
Roughly speaking, a clique is a subset of nodes preferring each other over those not in the subset. Borgs et al. [2016] formulated six axioms for community functions. Let's fix a non-empty finite set V and a community function C now.
Axiom 1 (Anonymity(A)) Let S, S
′ ⊆ V , and Π, Π ′ be two preference profiles on V . Assume that S ′ = σ(S) and
This axiom means that whether S is a community is determined by the preference profile rather than by labeling.
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity(Mon)) Let S ⊆ V , and Π, Π ′ be two preference profiles on
Intuitively, Monotonicity means that if the change of the preference profile does not increase the rank of any community member at the cost of decreasing the rank of any other member, then the community remains.
Axiom 3 (Embedding(Emb
Axiom 4 (World Community(WC)) For any preference profile Π on V , V ∈ C (V, Π).
To formulate the other two axioms, we need the following definition.
Given a preference network (V, Π) and S ⊆ V , if there is no T ⊆ V − S with |T | = |S| such that T ≻ πu S for all u ∈ S, then S is said to be self-approving with respect to Π. If for all ∅ = G S, there is no T ⊆ V − S with |G| = |T | such that T ≻ πu S all for u ∈ S − G, then S is called group stable with respect to Π.
Axiom 5 (Self-Approval(SA)) For any (V, Π), if S ∈ C(V, Π), then S is self-approving with respect to Π.
Self-Approval requires that the members of a community don't uniformly prefer an outside subset over the community.
Axiom 6 (Group Stability(GS)) Given (V, Π), if S ∈ C(V, Π), then S is group stable with respect to Π.
Group Stability means that a community cannot be partitioned into two parts such that all elements in one part prefers a subset out of the community over the other part.
There exist community functions satisfying all the axioms. Examples include C cliq and C comp (V, Π) = {S ⊆ V : S is self-approving and group stable}. Borgs et al. [2016] showed that this axiom system has nice properties. The most impressive property is that all community functions conforming to the six axioms, under operations ∩ and ∪, form a bounded lattice whose top and bottom are C comp and C cliq respectively. However, it is computationally hard to verify the key axioms GS and SA. 
Alternatives to GS and SA
The hardness of checking group stability of a subset S is partially rooted at enumerating equal-sized subsets of S and V − S. A natural idea to tackle this difficulty is to compare subsets of S just with V − S directly, rather than with its subsets. The first obstacle to this reduction is to enable comparing subsets of different sizes, so we extend the concept of lexicographical preference.
we have that π lexicographically prefers G over any T G ′ with |G| = |T |. By the definition of top lexicographical preference, we can get two propositions.
Now we are ready to define the alternative SGS (namely strong group stability) to GS. Let's arbitrarily fix a community function C.
Axiom 7 (SGS) For any preference network (V, Π) and any
Symmetrically, we have the following axiom which fixes S and enumerates subsets of V − S. It happens to formally coincide with SA, hence called SSA (short for strong selfstability). Axiom 8 (SSA) For any preference network (V, Π) and any subset S ⊆ V , if S ∈ C(V, Π), then for any T ⊆ V − S, there is u ∈ S such that u does not top-lexicographically prefer T over S. Roughly speaking, GS considers a community S not good if all members of some T S agree to replace S − T with a common, equal-sized group outside of S (hence V − S ≻ πt S−T for all t ∈ T ), while SGS just requires V −S ≻ πt S−T for all t ∈ T , which essentially means two facts. First, S − T can be replaced by a group of different size. Second, members of T might not have a common replacement of S − T (in case that |V − S| > |S − T |), but they reach an agreement on kicking S − T out of their community. In this case, it is reasonable to rule out such communities; see the following example. 1 We only define for the case |G| ≤ |G ′ |. A similar definition is straightforward for the case |G| > |G ′ |.
should not be a community since both {1, 2} and {3, 4} prefer V − S = {5} over each other. Though SGS does rule out S as a community, GS and SA cannot.
Properties
Here we present properties of SGS and SSA. First of all, they are shown to be stronger than GS and SA, respectively.
Proposition 4
For any community function C, if it satisfies SGS, then it also satisfies GS. Likewise for SSA and SA.
Proof. We prove this proposition by showing that for all communities S, S / ∈ C GS means S / ∈ C SGS and S / ∈ C SA means S / ∈ C SSA . Given a preference network (V, Π), if S is not in C GS (V, Π), then there exist two non-empty subset T S and T ′ ⊆ V − S such that |T ′ | = |T | and for all nodes u in S − T , u lexicographically prefers T ′ over T . By Proposition 2, u top lexicographically prefers V − S over T , which means that S is not in C SGS (V, Π).
If S is not in C SA (V, Π), then there exists a non-empty subset T ′ ⊆ V − S such that |S| = |T ′ | and for all nodes u in S, u lexicographically prefers T ′ over S. By Proposition 2, u top lexicographically prefers V − S over S, which means that S is not in C SSA (V, Π).
Let C scomp be the maximum community function that satisfies both SGS and SSA, namely for any preference network (V, Π), C SGS (V, Π) consists of all the subsets of V simultaneously allowed by SGS and SSA. It is a counterpart of C comp in [Borgs et al., 2016] , but in contrast to Theorem 1, it is efficiently checkable in the following sense.
for ∀u ∈ S do 3:
G ← {u} 4:
sign ← T rue 6:
if π s not top lexicographically prefers V − S over G then 8:
sign ← F alse 
return T rue
We will show that the time complexity of determine algorithm is O(|S| 4 )
Lemma 5 Given (V, Π) and S, if S does not satisfy SGS and T ⊂ S is an evidence, then for all non-empty sets G ⊂ T , all nodes in S − T top lexicographically prefer V − S over G.
The proof of Lemma 5 is straightforward by Proposition 3.
Lemma 6 Given (V, Π) and S ⊆ V , it is in time O |S| 4 to decide whether S ∈ C SGS (V, Π).
Proof. We prove this lemma by showing that Algorithm 1 returns N o if and only if S is not in C SGS (V, Π).
If S is not in C SGS (V, Π), then there exists an evidence T S. If the node u selected at line 3 is in T , then G will always be a subset of T by Lemma 5, which means that Algorithm 1 will terminate in line 10 and return N o. Since it traversals all nodes in line 2, Algorithm 1 will return N o.
If the algorithm returns N o, then all nodes in S − G top lexicographically prefer V − S over G, which means that S is not in C SGS (V, Π).
There are three loops in Algorithm 1 and each loop runs for |S| times at most. The complexity of line 7 is O(|S|), so the complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(|S| 4 ).
Lemma 7 Given (V, Π) and S, if |S| > 1 and S ∈ C SGS , then S ∈ C SSA Proof. We prove this lemma by showing that if |S| > 1, then S / ∈ C SSA implies S / ∈ C SGS . If S is not in C SSA , then there exists a node set T ′ ⊆ V − S such that for each node u in S, u top lexicographically prefers T ′ over S. If |T ′ | ≥ |S| and |S| > 1, then u prefers S − {u} over T ′ by Proposition 3 and u prefers S − {u} over V − S by Proposition 2, which means that S does not satisfies SGS and {S − {u}} is an evidence of S. If |T ′ | < |S|, let G be a subset S such that |G| = |T ′ |, then for all nodes u in S − G, u top lexicographically prefers T ′ over G and V − S over G by Proposition 2. By Proposition 3, u top lexicographically prefers V − S over G, which means S not satisfying SGS.
Theorem 8 Given (V, Π) and S
The proof of Theorem 8 is straightforward from Lemma 6 and Lemma 7. Being efficiently checkable is a desirable property of C scomp . In the next subsection, we will use it to find community functions that have various nice features as expected in [Borgs et al., 2016] .
Notation: Let A = {A, M on, W C, Emb, GS, SA} and SA = {A, M on, W C, Emb, SGS, SSA}. For a collection X of axioms, a community is said to be X -consistent if it conforms with all axioms in X .
We go on with showing that many good properties of A are preserved by SA. An example is the intersection lemma, one of the most important properties of A. Fortunately, it still holds in SA.
Lemma 9 (Intersection Lemma) Given a community function C satisfying any axiom X in {A, M on, W C, Emb}, then C ∩ C scomp satisfies X, SGS and SSA.
Proof. We prove this lemma by showing that C scomp satisfies A, M on, W C and Emb. and it is straightforward that C scomp satisfies A, W C or Emb.
By Lemma 7, if C SGS satisfies M on, then C scomp satisfies M on.
To see C SGS satisfying M on, let Π and Π ′ be preference profiles such that for all u, s ∈ S and v ∈ V , u ≻ π ′ s v → u ≻ πs v. If there exists a community S not in C SGS (V, Π), then there exists a non-empty node set T S such that for each node u in S − T , π u top lexicographically prefers V − S
, and C SGS satisfies M on.
In some sense, the critical role of intersection lemma lies in that it provides a normal form of consistent community functions: the intersection of a simple community function with C scomp . Intersection lemma ensures the lattice structure of SA-consistent community functions, which is also true for A and is one of the most striking results in [Borgs et al., 2016] . Theorem 10 Let C denote all SA-consistent community functions, then the algebraic structure T = {C, ∪, ∩} form a bounded lattice whose top and bottom are C scomp and C cliq , respectively. Proof. The proof is straightforward by the intersection lemma and the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Borgs et al. [2016] .
As a result, the richness of SA-consistent community functions is to some extent determined by the difference between C scomp and C cliq . Using an example inspired by [Borgs et al., 2016] which showed that the size of C comp can be larger than 2 |V |/2 , we observe that C scomp has the same property:
Proposition 11 For any positive integer n, there exists a preference network (V, Π) with |V | = n such that
Proof.
If n is an even number, consider a node set composed of m hero, sidekick . Let H = {h 1 , h 2 , ..., h m } be the set of heros and S = {s 1 , s 2 , ..., s m } be the set of sidekicks.
If there exists non-empty G ⊆ S such that H ∪ G / ∈ C SGS (V, Π), then any evidence T ⊂ H ∪ G is a subset of G since all nodes prefer the nodes in H over other nodes. But for all nodes s i in G, there exists a node h i in H which favourite s i over other nodes in S and if s i is in G, h i must be in G, which leads to contradictory, and the size of C scomp is larger than 2 ⌊n/2⌋ . If n is an odd number, then we set all preferences of n − 1 nodes in front of n nodes by above ways and ignore the communities including the last node, and the size of C scomp is larger than 2 ⌊n/2⌋ . Considering that the size of C cliq (V, Π) is at most linear (proved in Appendix), it seems that the collection of SAconsistent community functions is rich and the lattice is far from collapsing. The above proposition also implies that the though SGS and SSA are stronger than GS and SA, the restriction is not too much.
Consistent, constructive community functions
A community function C is said to be constructive if for any preference network (V, Π), the membership of C(V, Π) can be checked in polynomial-time in |V |. Constructive community functions are desirable, but it is not easy to figure out a non-trivial A-consistent one (non-trivial means essentially different from C cliq ). Borgs et al. [2016] mainly considered two families of candidates, namely C cliq(g) and C harmonious(λ) with non-negative real function g and real number λ ∈ [0, 1]. They showed that though A-consistent, C cliq(g) ∩C comp and C harmonious(λ) ∩C comp are nonconstructive in general. The definitions of C cliq(g) and C harmonious(λ) are presented here in order to make this paper self-contained.
Definition 3 (C cliq(g) ) Given a non-negative number function g : N → N ∪ {0}, for any preference profile (V, Π) and S ⊆ V , S is a community according to C cliq(g) if and only if ∀u, s ∈ S, π s (u) ∈ [1 : |S| + g(|S|)].
Definition 4 (C harmonious(λ) ) Given λ ∈ [0, 1], for any preference profile (V, Π) and S ⊆ V , S is a community according to C harmonious(λ) if and only if ∀u ∈ S, v ∈ V − S, at least λ-fraction of {π s : s ∈ S} prefer u over v.
On the other hand, in the context of SA, we have the following theorem mainly due to the intersection lemma and Theorem 8.
Theorem 12 If a constructive community function C satisfies
A, M on, Emb and W C, then C ∩ C scomp is SA-consistent and constructive.
This theorem greatly simplifies the problem of finding SA-consistent constructive community functions, since it is relative easy to find a constructive one that satisfies all of A, M on, Emb and W C. For example, for any nonnegative real function g and real number λ ∈ [0, 1], C cliq(g) and C harmonious(λ) conform with A, M on, Emb and W C. Hence, Theorem 12 immediately implies the following proposition.
Proposition 13
The community functions C cliq(g) ∩ C comp and C harmonious(λ) ∩C comp are SA-consistent and constructive, for any non-negative real function g and any real number λ ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, by Proposition 4, the two families community functions in Proposition 13 are also A-consistent and constructive.
In the next subsection we will go further in this direction and find a community function having more nice properties, solving an open problem posed by Borgs et al. [2016] .
C grow : an ideal community function
An ideal community function should not only be constructive (meaning easy to check the communities), but also be easy to present the communities. As a result, Borgs et al. [2014] (and the arXiv version of [Borgs et al., 2016] ) defined two more properties for community functions C:
• Samplable: given (V, Π), one can obtain a random sample of the communities in time polynomial in n = |V |; • Enumerable: given (V, Π), one can enumerate C(V, Π) in time O(n k |C(V, Π)|) for some constant k. et al. [2016] proposed the following open problem.
Borgs

Problem 1 (ACCSE) Find a natural community function that allows overlapping communities and is A-consistent, constructive, samplable, and enumerable.
C cliq is ruled out, because Borgs et al. [2014] proved that it does not allow overlapping communities.
We solve the ACCSE problem in this subsection. Actually, the following stronger problem is solved.
Problem 2 (SACCSE) Find a natural nontrivial community function that allows overlapping communities and is SAconsistent, constructive, samplable, and enumerable.
The basic idea of our solution is reducing the problem according to Theorem 12. Namely, if we find a community function C satisfying A, M on, W C and Emb, then C ∩ C scomp is SA-consistent. Furthermore, if C is enumerable and |C(V, Π)| is polynomial in |V | for all preference networks (V, Π)|, C ∩ C scomp will be enumerable and trivially samplable.
But how to find such a community function C? Our approach is inspired by the method in [Palla et al., 2005] . Roughly speaking, starting with the most harmonious substructures (namely, cliques), we grow the communities as much as possible, by adding nodes that keep the communities harmonious. Intuitively, this process of growing conforms with the formation of communities in real life (for example, consider how friendship forms). The key of the approach is to define harmonious communities, so we consider the following community function which is slightly adapted from C harmonious(λ) in [Borgs et al., 2014] .
Definition 5 (C harmon ) Given a preference network (V, Π), a subset S ⊆ V is a community according to C harmon if for all u ∈ S and v ∈ V − S, more than half of the members of S − {u} prefer u over v. Borgs et al. [2016] proved the following lemma.
Lemma 14 Given a preference network A(V, Π) and
S 1 , S 2 ∈ C clique (V, Π), then S 1 ⊂ S 2 , S 2 ⊂ S 1 or S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅
Proposition 15
Given a preference network A(V, Π), the upper bound of community numbers of C clique (V, Π) is 2|V |−1.
Proof. By Lemma 14, for all Π ∈ L(V )
V , the number of C clique (V, Π) is less than max
We complete the rest of the proof by mathematical induction.
If the size of V is 1, then
By mathematical induction, the upper bound of community numbers of C clique (V, Π) is 2|V | − 1.
Lemma 16 Given a preference network (V, Π) and S, it is O(|V |
3 ) to determine whether S is in C harmon (V, Π).
Proof. For each node u in S and each node v in V − S, it is O(|S|) to determine whether the majority of S − {u} prefer u over v, which means that it is O(|V | 3 ) to determine whether S is in C harmon (V, Π). Now we are ready to specify the community function C, which is denoted C grow in this paper. C grow is defined in terms of Algorithm 2, i.e., for any preference network (V, Π),
while C is not empty do 5:
for u in V − S do 7:
C.push(S ′ )
10:
return R Given a preference network (V, Π) and S, there exists at most one u ∈ V − S such that S ∪ {u} ∈ C harmon (V, Π). Hence, starting with any community S ∈ C cliq , at most O(n) communities (in the sense of C harmon ) can emerge. In this way we get an upper bound O(|V | 2 ) of the size of C grow (V, Π).
Then we discuss the time complexity of Algorithm 2. The If statement in line 8 is executed for |V − S| times for each community S. This fact, together with Lemma 16, implies that the time complexity of CLIQUEGROWING(V, Π) is O(|V | 6 ), which means that C grow is enumerable. In addition, it is straightforward to show that C grow conforms with A, M on, W C and Emb.
Up to now, we have proved that C grow ∩ C scomp is SAconsistent, constructive, samplable, and enumerable. The only issue not addressed is whether C grow ∩ C scomp degenerates to C cliq .
Proposition 17 For any node set V , there exists a preference profile Π such that the size of
Since the number of cliques of any preference network is O(|V |), the community function C grow ∩ C scomp far differs from C cliq . Altogether, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 18 C grow ∩ C scomp is a natural nontrivial community function that allows overlapping communities and is SA-CCSE.
So, the problem SACCSE is solved. By Proposition 4, C grow ∩ C scomp also solves the problem ACCSE.
An inverse problem: inferring preference profile from communities
In this section, we deal with the problem of inferring the preference profile from communities, namely, for a community function C, given S ⊆ 2 V , to find a preference profile Π such that S = C(V, Π). If such Π exists, we say that S can be generated by C. As the first step, we mainly consider and completely solve the case C = C cliq .
Non-overlapping community sets
This subsection characterizes the collection of communities that can be generated by C cliq . In [Borgs et al., 2014] , it was shown that for any preference network (V, Π), S = C cliq (V, Π) is non-overlapping, namely for any S 1 = S 2 ∈ S, either S 1 ⊆ S 2 or S 2 ⊆ S 1 . Now we prove the other direction: any non-overlapping collection of subsets that includes V can be generated by C cliq .
The proof is constructive, and the desired preference profile is the output of Algorithm 3 (Get Preference Profile), given a non-overlapping collection S of subsets of V .
We fix a total order σ = [1, 2, ..., n] ∈ L(V ), and define u's preference σ u = [u + 1, u + 2, ..., n, 1, 2, ..., u] for ∀u ∈ V . The notation σ u | S means the total order on S obtained by restricting σ u to S. For example, if S = {1, 2, 3, 5}, then
Algorithm 3 Get Preference Profile 1: procedure GETPROFILE(V, S)
for ∀u ∈ V do 3:
4:
return Π 7: procedure GETPREFERENCE(T ) Intuitively, Algorithm 3 determines preference profiles one by one. For each u ∈ V , GETPREFERENCE(S u ) sets the preference profile π u block by block as follows. Sorted by size in increasing order, S u is an inclusive list of communities, meaning that S u [i] S u [i + 1] for all 1 ≤ i < |S u |. Since the last community in S u equals V , S u naturally decomposes V into blocks: the i-th block is
π u is initialized such that block i ranks higher than block i+1 for all 1 ≤ i < |S u |. Then the order over each block is locally tuned according to σ u .
Theorem 19
If the set S of communities defined on V is nonoverlapping and Π is the result of GETPROFILE(V, S), then C cliq (V, Π) = S.
Proof. Given V and S ⊂ 2 V , let Π be result of GetΠ(V, S), and we prove this theorem by showing that S ∈ C clique (V, Π) if and only if S ∈ S.
Let π| 1:t denote the sub preference of preference π from the first node to t-th node. If S ∈ S, then for all nodes u in S, π u | 1,|S| ∈ L(S), which means that S ∈ C cliq (V, Π).
If there exists S ′ ∈ C clique (V, Π) that is not in S, then there exists an unique maximum S u 1 such that S u 1 S ′ because S is compatible, which means that there must exist a node t in S ′ − S u 1 . Since S is compatible and S u 1 is maximum, then S t 1 must be a subset of S u 1 while t / ∈ S u 1 and t ∈ S t 1 , which leads to contradictory.
Multi-preference profiles
Now we know that any community set which includes V can be generated by C cliq if and only if it is non-overlapping. A question then arises: given an overlapping collection of communities, can it be generated by an A/SA-consistent community function? The answer is negative, considering the following example. Let V = {1, 2, · · · , n}. It is natural that S 1 = {1, 2} and S 2 = {1, 3} are communities (taking friendship as an example). However, for any preference profile Π and any community function C satisfying GS or SGS, C(V, Π) cannot contain S 1 and S 2 simultaneously. So, the above mentioned preference networks are not expressive enough. A natural idea to tackle this problem is to endow every node with multiple preferences, coinciding with the concept of multi-preference profile propsosed by Borgs et al. [2016] .
Multi-preference profiles naturally arise in practice. As Borgs et al. [2016] mentioned, one member may have three preferences -one based on "family/friends", one based on "academic interests" and one based on "business interests". Meanwhile, another member may have two preferences -one based on "sports" and one based on "musics".
Formally, a multi-preference profile Π on V is a list { π u } u∈V with π u = {π
is a preference of u on V . A single-preference profile Π = {π u } u∈V is said to belong to Π if for each node u ∈ V , π u ∈ π u .
Any community function C on single-preference networks can be generalized to multi-preference networks in a natural way: given a multi-preference network (V, Π),
We are ready to study the inverse problem for multipreference networks, namely, given a S ⊂ 2 V , can we find a multi-preference profile Π on V such that S = C cliq (V, Π)? When such a Π exists, we still say that S is generated by C cliq .
The answer is yes, if V ∈ S. The desired multi-preference profile Π is found by Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Get Exact Multi-Preferences
for S ∈ S do 3:
return Π In Algorithm 4, the total order is defined in Subsection 4.1, and the operation in lines 5 and 6 is the same as that in Algorithm 3. The algorithm is self-explained.
Theorem 20 Given S defined on V , suppose Π be the result of GetExact Π(V, S), and then S = C cliq (V, Π).
Proof. For all communities S in S and for all nodes u in S, there exists a preference π S u in π u such that π S u | 1:|S| is in L(S), which means that S is in C cliq (V, Π) and S ⊆ C cliq (V, Π).
If there exists a community S ∈ C cliq (V, Π) not in S, then S is not V and there must exist a node p ∈ S such that the next node q of p in σ is not in S (Actually we treat σ as a circle instead of a list, so if p is the last node in σ, then q is the first node in σ). Since p is in S, then there exists a preference π
′ | + 1 and must be less than |S|, which leads to contradictory.
GetExact Π(V, S) sets a preference π S u for u ∈ S in the inner For loop, so the number of preferences in π u is the number of communities containing u. To our surprise, though the preferences for different nodes and different community are constructed independently, their combination does not produce extra communities.
However, generally, in Π produced by Algorithm 4, each nodes has too many preferences. Can we solve the problem using fewer preferences? Fortunately, given a node set V and a community set S ⊂ 2 V , we find an algorithm to generate a multi-preference profile Π with minimum preferences number such that S ⊆ C cliq (V, Π).
Algorithm 5 Get Minimum Multi-Preferences
let G u be the inclusion graph of S u 5:
for each P ∈ P do /*P is a list of communities*/ 7:
The procedure GETPREFERENCE is defined in Algorithm 3. The inclusion graph G u of S u is a directed graph with communities in S u as vertices. For any two communities S 1 , S 2 ∈ S u with S 1 S 2 , there exists a directed edge in G u from S 1 to S 2 . MINPATHCOVER is the algorithm defined in [Ntafos and Hakimi, 1979] which solves the minimum path cover problem on directed acyclic graphs. If the inclusion graph is input, each output path is actually an inclusive list of communities, so each P ∈ P is a valid input to the procedure GETPREFERENCE . Because both GETPREF-ERENCE and MINPATHCOVER are polynomial in time, so is Algorithm 5.
For each node u, the number of preferences in π u is minimum in the following sense. For any multi-preference profile
Theorem 21 Given S ⊂ 2 V , GET Π(V, S) outputs the minimum Π such that S ⊆ C cliq (V, Π).
Proof. For all communities S ∈ S and all nodes u ∈ S, there exists a community set P in P u such that S ∈ P . Let π P u be the result of GETPREFERENCE(P ), then π P u ∈ L(S), which means that S ∈ C cliq (V, Π).
For all nodes u in V , the number of preferences in its multipreference is minimum for generating the communities in C u , so the number of preferences in multi-preference profile is minimum.
Nevertheless, this Π may generate communities which are not in S. For example, let V be {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and S be {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 4, 5}, {1, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}}. A legal configuration of P i , i = 1, 2, 5 is as follows.
• P 1 : P 1 1 = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 4, 5}}, P 1 2 = {{1, 4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}} • P 2 : P 2 1 = {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 4, 5}}, P 
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the problem of defining an axiomatic system for community functions in a network. A previous system included six axioms, but two of them, GS and SA, are rather hard (i.e., coNP-complete) to verify while they play very crucial roles in this system. We modified these axioms and obtained two new axioms SGS and SSA. The time complexity of determining whether a given subset S ⊆ V satisfies the two new axioms, SGS and SSA, becomes O(|S| 4 ). By the intersection lemma, we found two constructive and SA-consistent community functions. We also found an SAconsistent, constructive, samplable and enumerable community function that allows overlapping communities, and answers to an open problem in [Borgs et al., 2016] .
We dealt with the problem that inferring preference profile from communities. For a special class of community sets, we completely solved this problem, and for general community sets, we proposed multi-preference profiles and found an algorithm to inferring a multi-preference profile Π from a given community set S such that S = C cliq (V, Π). We also proposed an algorithm to find a minimum multi-preference profile Π such that S ⊆ C cliq (V, Π) . A remaining open problem is whether the minimum preference profile Π can be chosen to make sure S = C cliq (V, Π).
